Calhoun’s Attitude on the Oregon Question by Morgan, Joseph Clifford
KU ScholarWorks | The University of Kansas Pre-1923 Dissertations and Theses Collection
Calhoun’s Attitude on the
Oregon Question
1910
by Joseph Clifford Morgan
This work was digitized by the Scholarly Communications program 
staff in the KU Libraries’ Center for Digital Scholarship.
http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu
Submitted to the Department of History of the 
University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for  the Degree of Master of Arts
C A L H O U N ' S A T T I T U D E 
0 N 
T H E O R E G O N Q U E S T I O N 
1 9 1 0 . 
L/C e-
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
Calhoun's Correspondence Published in the Report of 
The American Historical Association for 1899, Vol. II. 
Calhoun: Works, Vols. IV and V. 
Reeves: American Diplomacy Under Tyler and Polk. 
Von Hoist: Constitutional History of The United states, 
Vol. III. 
Von Hoist: Life of Calhoun. 
Hunt: Life of Calhoun. 
Curtis: Life of Buchanan, Vol. I. 
Tyler's Tyler, Vols. II and III. 
tfiles Register, LXVI -- LXX. 
Walpole; History of England 1815 - 1860, Vol. V. 
Richardson: Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. IV. 
Trent: Southern Statesmen of the Old Regime. 
Letters on Oregon: Correspondence of Calhoun, Buchanan 
and Pakenham. 
What is known as the Oregon country was claimed by 
both the United States and England on the basis of discovery 
and settlement. In addition each country claimed to hare 
acquired the rights of Spain, England by the Conventions of 
1790 and 1794, and the United States by the treaty of 1819 • 
The attempts to adjust the conflicting claims, in 1806 and 
in 1814, failed. But the line of the forty-ninth parallel 
as far west as the Rocky Mountains was acceptable to both 
countries. The convention of 1818, which was an outgrowth 
of the treaty of Ghent, provided for joint occupation of 
the country west of the Rocky Mountains. This agreement 
was to last for ten years and was "not to be construed to 
the prejudice of any claim" that either party had to the 
territory in question. In 1819 Spain surrendered to the 
United states her claiin to all territory north of the 
forty-second parallel. In a treaty with Russia, 1824, it 
was provided that "no settlement shall be made hereafter 
on the northwest coast of America , north of fifty-
four degrees, forty minutes of north latitude, by citizens 
of the United States nor by the Russian subjects 
south of the same parallel of latitude". A similar treaty 
was concluded between Russia and Great Britain the next year. 
Thus the north and south limits of the Oregon country were 
placed at fifty-four forty and forty-two respectively.2 
The negotiations carried on by Rush and Canning, in 1824, 
failed, but the claims of each country were set forth. 
The United States offered the forty-ninth parallel to the 
Pacific Ocean as the boundary, denying to England the free 
navigation of the Columbia. But England was willing to 
accept that parallel only to where it struck the "north-
easternmost branch of the Columbia, and thence down the 
middle of the Columbia to the Pacific"• Negotiations on 
the subject were resumed by Gallatin, in 1826—27. He 
renewed the offer of Rush, and, in addition^conceded the 
the free navigation of the Columbia. The result was the 
renewal of the agreement for joint occupation for an 
indefinite period, terminable upon a twelve month 1s notice 
by either party. Thus the matter rested until the adminis-
tration of President Tyler. No reference was made to it 
in the Webster-Ashburton treaty of 1842, but immediately 
thereafter Lord Aberdeen urged that the remaining dispute 
be taken up. Preparations for doing so were being made 
by Mr. Pakenham and Secretary of State Uphur when the sad 
accident on board the Princeton took place. 
In selecting Calhoun as the successor of Upshur, it 
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is apparent that President Tyler had in mind the settlement 
of the Texan and the Oregon questions. The position of 
Calhoun on the latter question had been set forth by him 
at length in a speech 4 in the Senate, Jan. 24, 1843. 
Stated briefly it was a "let alone" 5 policy. Time and 
westward emigration were the all-powerful means by which 
the Oregon territory would be preserved for the United 
States. All this country needed to do in order to effect 
its object was to maintain a "wise and masterly inactivity*m 
The less the question was agitated the better. To this 
course Calhoun was thoroughly consistent until compelled 
to assume a different attitude by the stress of the Mexican 
question. 
In his letter 6 of acceptance Calhoun agreed with Tyler 
that the Texan and the Oregon questions were sadly in need 
of attention. Both seem to have regarded them as critical^ 
and Calhoun declared that their critical condition was 
the only consideration which induced him to accept the 
appointment. And he entered upon the work of the office 
with a firm conviction that he could conclude the negotia-
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tions concerning both questions. However, it was with 
some reluctance that he again took up the work of public 
life and only on condition that, when the negotiations were 
successfully concluded, he would be relieved of the office, 
Although Calhoun entered the cabinet wit v the avowed 
purpose of settling both the Oregon and the Texam questions 
he seems to have given all his attention to the latter. 
This course has led to the charge that he would have 
sacrificed Oregon for the sake of Texas. Texas would 
mean another slave state; Oregon a free one. But 
Calhoun justified himself on the ground that the question 
of the annexation of Texas was a pressing one, while Oregon, 
could wait. As a matter of fact this was Calhoun1 s theory 
that the longer the Oregon question was delayed, the more 
favorable would be its final settlement to the United 
States. But if it could wait then its condition was not 
critical. Calhoun, however, believed it to he critical 
only to the extent that it was tampered with. On the 
other hand the Texan question could not wait. England 
had been manifesting a friendly interest in Texas and was 
desirous of making it a free state. There was fear that 
she was using her influence against the annexation 
movement and that Texas, if the United States should 
reject her offer, would make a similar proposal to England.1 
Calhoun, therefore, wished to anticipate such a possibility 
by making sure its annexation to the United States. 
Thus by hastening the Texan negotiations, difficulties 
would be avoided just as by pressing the Oregon question, 
they might arise. The idea of Texas a free state was 
unthinkable to Calhoun. Should such a plan be consummated 
slavery would be cut off trm all further extension and 
would be surrounded by a wall of freedom. Therefore 
Calhoun did not take up the Oregon question until forded 
to do so by the suggestion of 7!r. Pakenham and the order 
of President Tyler. Paken vam offered the line of the 
forty-ninth parallel to the Columbia and down it to the 
Pacific. Calhoun rejected this offer and demanded the 
valley of the Columbia. His defanse of the American 
claim to the forty-ninth parallel as the boundary is 
masterly and dismisses all doubt as to his patriotism. 
He believed that the claim of the United States to the 
forty-ninth parallel was clear and unquestionable. But 
the fifty-four forty claim was to him idle and unfounded. 
Pakenham thensuggested arbitration, but Calhoun believing 
firmly that the question could be settled by negotiation, 
rejected this plan also. President Tyler shared the 
same belief. 
Thus Tyler fs administration closed with the Oregon 
question still at issue. However Calhoun seems to have 
been well satisfied with the state of the negotiations 
when^eft office. Writing to Mrs. T. G. Clemson, May 22, 
1845 , he says: "While conducting the Texian question 
successfully by bold and decisive measures, I was conduct-
ing the Oregon with equal success, by a quiet, amicable, 
but firm course. I - - - - would have terminated the 
negotiations last winter in time to be laid before Congress, 
had Mr. Pakenham received instructions from his government 
as early as he had expected." In another letter 9 he 
writes to the same 9ttoot: "I saw my way clearly through 
it (Oregon negotiation), and left it in a good way." 
However these utterances may be due more to the customary 
suspicion with which most men look upon the work of their 
successors*than to any real basis. As to the instructions 
which Fr. Pakenham was to havu received from his go vernmnt, 
it is difficult to say. Leastwise he seems not to have 
received them by the next summer at the time of the negotia-
tion with Mr. Buchanan. But it is true that Sir Robert 
Peel was so much interested in home matters that he for 
a long time neglected the foreign affairs of his country. 
Whatever may have been Calhoun's hopes for the 
adjustment of the Oregon dispute by his "quiet and amicable11 
course, they were rudely shattered by the attitude of 
President Polk. In keeping with the popular sentiment 
he declared that our title to the Oregon territory was 
"clear and unquestionable". During the preceding 
campaign there had ^een great excitement in the west over 
the Oregon boundary and the cry of "fifty-four forty or 
fight n had been rife. Polk either yielding to the 
popular clamor or to serve some purpose of his own took 
an emphatic and advanced position on this question. His 
declarations in his inaugural address and in his first 
annual message to congress caused great indignation in 
England and lead many on both sides of the Atlantic to 
believe that war was inevitable. Calhoun especially 
professed great alarm v . He believed that a wa$ with 
England would be a fatal calamity and would result in the 
loss of all the territory in dispute; that it was unnecessary 
and avoidable if the right course were pursued, but inevitable 
if Polk continued his threatening attitude; England did 
not desire war, but would not refuse it, if forced upon 
her; if war resulted, it would be because of Oregon, not 
Texas; moreover Mexico was directly under the influence t 
of England and a war with the latter country would destroy 
all hope of a peaceable adjustment of the Texan boundary. 
Polk would h ve to retract or war was inevitable. 
So great was Calhoun1 s fear of war that he returned 
to the senate to stem, if possible,the strong current 
flowing towards hostilities 1 1* President Polk in his 
message had recommended the serving of the years notice 
as provided for in the convention of 1827, thus bringing 6 
to an end joint occupation. A resolution 1 2 to this 
effect was soon introduced. Calhoun at first was 
strenously opposed to its adoption 1 3 . Eis hope of d 
defeating it lay in getting a majority in the senate 
against it. He relied 1 4upon the Atlantic states and on 
the south. The adoption of the resulution would mean 
an end to the policy 6f "wise and masterly inactivity". 
It would also mean war unless Polk retracted or England 
backed down. Tor the sake of peace Calhoun would have 
amended the resulution by offering the forty-ninth parallel 
as a basis of a compromise, or even reference to arbitra-
tion 1 5 , if nothing tetter could he done* (However he had 
refused arbitration when Secretary of State). Writing 
to James lammond January 23, 1846, he says: "The odds 
are against me. The South, most unfortunately, is divided. 
The Whigs are timid, jealous and distracted. The adminis-
tration professing to desire peace acts to the contrary." 
As time went on Calhoun became more hopeful. The 
war sentiment in the United States gradually died down and 
news from England became more encouraging. However a 
nev: danger loomed up in the southwest. Relations with 
Mexico were becoming more strained and a war seemed probable. 
This probability caused Calhoun to change quite materially 
his attitude towards the Oregon question. If war with 
England alone was to be dreaded, much more so was a double 
war v/ith both England and Mexico. In order to prevent 
such a complication, it became necessary to settle the 
Oregon dispute as speedily as possible. With that out of 
the way, war with Mexico would be less likely. Calhoun 
therefore, favored passing the resolution in sane modified 
form and thus open the way for a resumption of negotiations, 
which had been suspended (August 1845 ). In his famous 1 6 
speech on serving notice, March 16, 1846, he declared that 
the time was ripe for a compromise. Assurances were 
received on loth sides of the willingness of the other to 
treat. Sir Robert Peel disapproved of Pakenham1 s hasty 
rejection of Buchanan's offer. According to new instruc-
tions from Lord Aberdeem, Pakenham offered the forty-ninth 
parallel to the channel seperating Vancouver Island from *. 
the continent, retaining the free navigation of the 
Columbia, and the treaty was signed June 15, 1846. 
Calhoun took great credit to himself for this happy 
solution of so serious a problem; and no doubt his efforts 
had great weight. Professor Von Hoist goes so far as to 
say t^at this is his chief claim for his country's 
gratitude 1 7 . However, equal credit must be awarded to 
the determined opposition of Webster, the skillful 
diplomacy of Buchanan, and the good sense and modera ion 
of Lord Aberdeen. 
For the most part Calhoun's extreme fear of a war 
with Englandwds justified by the seriousness of the 
situation. But there are other reasons which account 
for his fear. The fact that the negotiations were in 
other hands than his own and the ignorance of everyone 
as to what was Polk's real plan and purpose explain much 
of Calhoun's uneasiness. It may be that Calhoun secretly 
wished to remain at the head of the Department of State. 
At any rate lie criticised very severely the administration 
and its conduct of both the Oregon and the Texan negotia-
tions. He speaks of the "folly and weakness" of the 
administration and charges that the negotiations were 
"wretchedly managed". He finally realized 1 8 that Polk fs 
inaugural address and message were in a large degree of a 
diplomatic character, a "blustering announcement" as 
Lord Russel characterized the former. It seems that he 
did not doubt that Polk and his cabinet desired peace. 
In his advocacy of the Resolution of Abrogation he believed 
he was creating for Polk an honorable means of getting 
out of the dilemma in which he had placed himself. And 
he held in abeyance his opposition 1 9 to the Mexican War 
that lae might not embarrass the President in his Oregon 
negotiation. 
The Oregon question was settled amicable , but war 
with Mexico ensued. Just how far the Oregon trouble 
influenced Mexico to go to war with the United States, it 
is difficult to say. It is hardly probable that England 
held out any hope to Mexico either of intervention or of 
a war with the United States over Oregon. But it is not 
so difficult to believe that Mexico entertained such a 
hope. While England did not wish herself to go to war 
with the United States, yet she might have been willing to 
make trouble for her with Mexico. But it is not probable 
that England wished a war between the United States and 
Mexico knowing as she surely did that its inevitable 
result would "be the acquisition by the former of California 
and New Mexico; unless perchance she was convinced that 
Polk was determined to have that territory at any cost. 
Calhoun regarded the war with Mexico as unnecessary 
and without justification. He maintained that if he 
could have remained in office for a longer tenure the 
Oregon and the Texan questions would have been amicably 
settled. He denied that the annexation of Texas was a 
casus belli with Mexico. Proper diplomacy would have 
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prevented hostilities • If the Oregon question had been 
kept in the background, there would have been no trouble 
with Mexico. This position is supported by McLane who 
gave it as his opinion that if the declaration of war 
against Mexico had been known by the British Cabinet, 
Pakenham would not have been authorized to offer such 
liberal terms. As it was, it was decided by a bare 
majority. 
Why did Calhoun so greatly fear a war \vith England? 
One reason is suggested by a statement in his speech of 
March 16, 1846, to which reference has already been made. 
In this he said: WI am, on principle, opposed to war and 
in favor of peace, because I regard peace as a positive 
good and war as a positive evil? But his record is to 
the contrary. As chairman of the Committee on foreign 
Relations in 1812 he had taken a leading part in the war 
movement. It is probable that he would have gone to war 
over Texas rather than have seen it annexed by England 2 1. 
At least he would have resisted intervention by any 
European Power to prevent its annexation to the United 
States. However, Calhoun justifies himself in this 
attitude "by assuming that either the annexation of Texas 
"by England or its existence as a free and independent 
state would have sooner or later led to war. On the 
other hand he was vehemently opposed to the war with 
Mexico declaring it unnecessary and the result of folly 
and incompetence. 
Calhoun clearly perceived that a war with England 
would probably result in the loss to the United States 
of the territory in dispute# England could defend her 
claim more effectively that could the United States. 
He also saw that a /v'ar would destroy all hopes for free 
trade which were then so bright as a result of the efforts 
of Sir Robert Feel. 
Another compelling reason was the fear that increased 
power would accrue to the National Government as a result 
of war. It fs authority and influence would be vastly 
enlarged. The doctrine of states1 rights would become 
a thing of the past. "If we avoid war," said he, "and 
adhere to peace all this (prosperity, etc.) will be e 
effected, I trust, without the loss of our free popular 
institutions. ) ) ) War may make us great; but only 
peace can make us both great and free." 
But more important than all these Calhoun dreaded 
a war with England because of its probable effects upon 
slavery. In a letter to James E. Calhoun, January 16, 
1846, he says: "To defeat the war in my opinion is to 
gain everything and to fail to defeat it is to lose all. 
It would leave us of the south little worth having." 
Writing to James H. Hammond a little later he is more 
definite: "The abolitionists are all for war, with the 
avowed intention of crushing us and our institutions." 
England's interest in securing the abolition of slavery 
was well known. It was the nightmare which haunted 
Calhoun during the Texan negotiations, and, like Bangno's 
ghost, it reappeared with the Oregon dispute. During 
the discussion over Polk's inaugural address the London 
Times sounded a note of warning: "Have they forgotten in 
their anxiety to extend their "domestic institutions" to 
the whole continent of America that in the event of war 
t vey will have to encounter the most novel of all dangers— 
that arise from the presence of the standard of freedom 
among a population of slaves?" Lord Palmerston expressed 
himself as having little fear that the United States 
would undertake a war in which the fate of slavery 
might be an issue. Therefore it required little 
imagination on Calhoun's part to picture the worst for the 
South in case of war; and he easily foresaw that, if the 
United States was worsted, the abolition of slavery might 
be a sine qua non of peace. Such a fear was, no doubt, 
very real to the mind of Calhoun, wrought up as it was 
by the anti-slavery agitation in the United States and 
keenly sensitive to whatever affected in the least the 
"domestic institution" of the South. On the other hand 
if the United States was successful, Canada might be v/on, 
and the power of the free states thereby greatly enlarged. 
Calhoun's attitude,therefore, was this: He favored a 
policy of "wise and masterly inactivity" as the surest 
and best for the United States and certain to win in the 
long run. By keeping the Oregon question in the back-
ground there was little fear of English intervention in 
Texas. But after Polk had forced the Oregon question 
to the front, its speedy settlement became necessary in 
order to avoid complications with Mexico and England. 
As long as it was unsettled war with either country would 
involve us in war withthe other. In either case war was 
unjustifiable, unnecessary, and easily avoidable by 
proper diplomacy. And permeating his wh~le attitude 
and largely directing his course was his undying devotion 
tc the South and his aggressive defense of its "peculiar 
Constitution". 
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